We examine the optimal choice of hurdle rates in a capital budgeting setting in which a manager receives superior information regarding the profitability of an investment project. Unlike the prior capital budgeting literature that treats the distribution of investment returns as exogenous, we consider a scenario in which the manager can engage in upfront project development activities to improve the quality of investment opportunity. To motivate the project development effort while ensuring truthful information flow, the optimal hurdle rate is always lower than what it would be if the manager's project development effort were directly observable. We show that the optimal hurdle rate can even be below the firm's cost of capital under plausible circumstances. We also examine how the optimal hurdle rate varies with the ex ante quality of the firm's investment opportunities, and find that optimal hurdle rates will be higher in firms whose investment opportunities are relatively good or relatively poor than in firms with investment opportunities of intermediate quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
C apital budgeting, or investment appraisal, is arguably one of the most critical and challenging management tasks in business organizations. One approach that seems prevalent in practice is that firms set hurdle rates, or minimum rates of return, that investment projects are required to meet in order to receive funding. Empirical evidence suggests a great deal of variation across firms in their choices of hurdle rates.
1 For instance, Poterba and Summers (1995) survey CEOs at Fortune 1000 companies and find that the reported hurdle rates exhibit considerable variation across the respondent firms. They find
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2
Their findings also show that, even within the same firm, hurdle rates often vary in a wide range as a function of the type of investment projects.
3 These empirical findings seem to suggest that the internal capital allocation process is more complex than that presumed in the extant theoretical literature.
The standard textbook solution advocates that, in order to maximize shareholder value, a firm should set investment hurdle rate equal to its actual cost of capital (Brealey and Myers 2000; Young and O'Byrne 2001) . This prescription is predicated on the presumption that shareholders and managers share identical objectives and are symmetrically informed about their firms' investment opportunities. In contrast, the capital budgeting literature based on agency theory presumes that self-interested managers have goals different from those of shareholders, and possess superior information about their firms' investment opportunities. These models show that with managerial private information, the second-best mechanisms entail capital rationing; i.e., optimal hurdle rates exceed actual costs of capital (Antle and Eppen 1985; Harris and Raviv 1996) . 4 While these models provide a potential explanation for capital rationing, they do not explain all of the variation observed in firms' choices of internal hurdle rates. For instance, this literature fails to explain why hurdle rates are sometimes lower than firms' true costs of capital. There is a need to enrich capital budgeting models in order to explain the choice of internal hurdle rates that can evidently vary from capital rationing to capital leniency. We develop a model in which a self-interested manager receives private information about a potential investment opportunity. The manager also exerts an unobservable level of general operational effort to increase the firm's cash flows from its existing assets. One of the limiting features of the extant agency-theoretic models of capital budgeting is that firms' investment opportunities are assumed to be entirely exogenous. We relax this assumption and presume that the manager can exert a personally costly effort to develop the investment opportunity before he learns its true profitability. The project's expected returns are increasing in the level of upfront project development effort exerted by the manager. Such project development activities play a crucial role in many capital investment contexts. Frequently, managers must exert considerable effort in conceiving and developing investment projects before they can assess the viability of these projects with reasonable accuracy. For example, prior to the submission of investment proposals on developing new products or entering new markets, extensive effort is necessary to formulate ideas and identify potential customers.
After the manager has exerted his project development effort and received information regarding the project's profitability, he reports his private information to the firm's owner who then decides whether to fund the project. Since the owner cannot independently verify the project's viability nor monitor the manager's efforts, she must rely on her choice of hurdle rate and managerial compensation plan to generate desirable managerial incentives. Our analysis shows that the manager's incentives to exert project development effort are decreasing in the owner's choice of hurdle rate. As a consequence, the optimal hurdle rate is lower than what it would be if the manager's project development effort could be directly dictated. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of Poterba and Summers (1995), we
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To understand our findings, consider first a ''standard'' capital budgeting setting in which the firm's investment opportunity set is exogenous and hence the manager does not contribute any project development effort. After privately learning the project's return, the manager reports his private information to the owner. The manager has an incentive to understate the project's return because it allows him to exert less general purpose effort and ascribe the resulting poor performance to low investment returns. To counteract this incentive, the owner must pay the manager informational rents. Since the manager can benefit from misreporting the project's returns only if the project is undertaken, the manager earns these informational rents only if the project is approved. To economize on the manager's informational rents, the owner forgoes marginally profitable projects by imposing a hurdle rate that exceeds her true cost of capital.
In our model, however, the manager must be provided with incentives not only to report information truthfully, but also to improve the quality of the investment opportunity through his project development efforts. While managerial informational rents are often viewed as private benefits that accrue to self-interested managers at the expense of the firm, they serve a useful incentive role in our model; that is, they provide the manager with incentives to exert project development effort. Since the manager earns informational rents only when the project is undertaken, a lower hurdle rate increases the likelihood that the manager enjoys the benefits of project approval. As a consequence, the manager's incentives to contribute project development effort are decreasing in the hurdle rate chosen by the owner.
The optimal choice of hurdle rate balances the owner's conflicting objectives of minimizing managerial compensation and providing desirable project development incentives. Consequently, the optimal hurdle rate is lower than what it would be if the project development effort were directly observable. We identify plausible circumstances under which the optimal hurdle rate is actually below the firm's cost of capital. We also find that the optimal hurdle rate is non-monotonic in the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set. To understand this result, note that the owner finds it desirable to set a lower hurdle rate because it increases the manager's incentives to engage in personally costly project development activities. As the ex ante project quality becomes relatively poor or relatively good, however, the manager's choice of project development effort becomes relatively insensitive to the hurdle rate. Our analysis thus predicts that optimal hurdle rates will be higher in firms whose investment opportunity sets are relatively good or relatively poor than in firms whose investment opportunity sets are of intermediate quality. To the extent that a firm's historical performance proxies for the ex ante quality of its investment opportunities, our analysis predicts that hurdle rates will be higher in firms with ''extreme'' performance than in firms with ''average'' performance.
We also consider a decentralized setting in which the investment decision is delegated to the manager. In the delegated setting, the manager is no longer required to report his private information to the owner. Instead, the optimal effort and investment decisions must be induced through a proper choice of managerial performance measure. Our analysis shows that a linear compensation contract based on residual income can generate optimal effort and investment incentives, provided that the capital charge rate is based on the firm's optimal hurdle rate.
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March 2009 American Accounting Association Our analysis is related to the literature on capital budgeting under asymmetric information. The list includes Harris et al. (1982) , Antle and Eppen (1985) , Holmstrom and Costa (1986) , Bernardo et al. (2001) , Baldenius (2003) , Baldenius et al. (2007) , Reichelstein (2002), and Dutta (2003) . These papers show that when the manager has private information about the project's profitability, the second-best hurdle rate is higher than the cost of capital. These models, however, assume that the distribution of project returns is exogenous and do not consider the possibility that the manager, through his project development activities, can affect the distribution of investment returns. In our model, the return distribution is endogenous in that the manager's choice of project development effort affects the project's expected profitability. Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Baiman and Rajan (1998) also consider settings in which the agent's private information is endogenous. Laffont and Tirole (1993) outline a procurement model in which a regulated firm can commit some investment to reduce the expected value of its future production costs and examine how the possibility of such non-contractible investment changes the regulator's choice of cost-reimbursement rule.
5 Baiman and Rajan (1998) examine the optimal choice of cost standards for a production agent who can invest in skill acquisition activities to enhance his future cost efficiency. Their analysis identifies a trade-off between inducing skill acquisition activities and production efforts. While our analysis and these two studies share the modeling feature that the agent's type is endogenous, our article is quite different from these two studies in terms of its research focus and other modeling choices.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II describes the economic setting. Section III first characterizes the optimal choice of hurdle rate in a benchmark setting in which the distribution of investment returns is exogenously specified. It then examines the choice of optimal hurdle rate when the manager can exert project development effort to stochastically enhance investment returns. Section IV concludes.
II. MODEL
We model a one-period principal-agent relationship between a firm's risk-neutral owner (principal) and its risk-neutral manager (agent). The period begins at date 0 and ends at date 1. At the beginning of the period, the firm has access to a potentially profitable project. Undertaking this project requires an initial cash outlay of k dollars at date 0, and generates cash inflow of (1 ϩ r) ⅐ k dollars at date 1. Therefore, r denotes the project's rate of return. The end-of-period cash flow to the firm is given by:
where I ʦ {0,1} is an indicator variable that denotes whether the project is undertaken, and a denotes the manager's unobservable choice of effort. We note that managerial effort a improves the firm's cash flow regardless of its investment choice I. For this reason, and also to distinguish it from the project development effort discussed below, a will be referred to as general operational effort. The owner seeks to maximize the net present value of the firm's cash flow net of compensation payment to the manager, s:
Ϫ1 is the firm's discount factor and r ƒ is the cost of capital, which in our risk-neutral setting equals the risk-free rate. To simplify notation, we normalize the risk-free rate r ƒ to zero, and hence the project's NPV is simply equal to
A key feature of our model is the notion that many investment projects, such as launching new products or entering new markets, require extensive development efforts in formulating plans and identifying new customers. The expected payoff from such a project is likely to depend on the level of development effort undertaken prior to its implementation. To model this, we assume that the rate of return r is increasing in the level of project development effort undertaken by the manager. In particular, the project's rate of return r is given by:
where e denotes the level of project development effort chosen by the manager, represents the ex ante quality of the firm's investment opportunities, and ε ʦ (Ϫϱ,ϱ) is the realization of a zero mean random variable. While the manager's choice of e is not observable to the owner, the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set, , is a commonly known parameter. It is also common knowledge that the random variable ε is drawn from a distribution F(ε) with positive density ƒ(ε) on the whole real line. We assume that the density function ƒ(⅐) is unimodal and symmetric around zero and is at least twice continuously differentiable throughout its support. 6 Furthermore, we assume that F(⅐) satisfies the usual monotone inverse hazard rate condition; i.e.,
The monotone inverse hazard rate condition is satisfied by many common distributions such as uniform, normal, exponential, and gamma (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005) .
In our model, the manager exerts two types of efforts: (i) project development effort e ʦ [0, and (ii) general operational effort a ʦ [0,
The manager is effort-averse and his e], a].
disutilities of project development effort e and operational effort a are given by v(e) ϭ v 2 ⅐ e 2 and w(a) ϭ ⅐ a 2 , respectively, with v Ͼ 0 and w Ͼ 0. The risk-neutral manager's net w 2 utility (net payoff) is therefore given by:
The manager has no personal funds of his own. This limited wealth constraint prevents the owner from selling the firm to the manager. At the beginning of the period, the manager decides whether to accept the contract offered by the owner. If the manager accepts the contract, he chooses the level of project development effort e. Subsequently, the manager privately observes the project's rate of return r and submits his report r to the owner. In response to the manager's report, the owner makes the investment decision according to the pre-committed investment policy.
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FIGURE 1 Time Line
Finally, the manager contributes operational effort a and the end-of-period cash flow is realized. This sequence of events is depicted in the time line in Figure 1 .
A key set of assumptions of our analysis are that (i) the manger cannot be prevented from quitting after observing r, and therefore the manager's participation constraints must be satisfied not only on ex ante basis (i.e., in expectation over r), but also on interim basis for each realized value of r, and (ii) the owner commits to an incentive scheme at the very outset. That is, the owner designs and commits to an incentive scheme at the outset such that the manager finds it in his interest to stay with the firm for each realized value of r. Given that the manager is intimately involved with the development of the project, it is reasonable to presume that the manager is essential for its successful implementation. If the project were to disappear with the manager, then the owner would then have endogenous incentives to design a compensation scheme such that each type of manager would stay with the firm.
Notice that the owner can only observe the aggregate cash flow in Expression (1), but not its individual components related to returns from investment and general operational effort a. The owner's inability to observe the individual components of the aggregate cash flow, combined with the manager's private information regarding the project's rate of return r, creates an agency problem that prevents the owner from achieving the first-best outcomes. Specifically, in our model, the manager has a natural incentive to shirk on his operational effort and ascribe the resulting poor performance to low investment returns.
III. OPTIMAL HURDLE RATES Benchmark Setting
First, we examine the optimal choice of hurdle rate in a benchmark setting in which the project development effort e is an exogenous parameter. The manager submits a report r about the project's rate of return to the owner after the owner has committed to an incentive plan for the manager. Given the revelation principle, we consider only incentive plans that induce the manager to reveal his information truthfully. A managerial incentive plan specifies the manager's compensation s(r), the required performance c(r) (measured in terms of the end-of-period cash flow), and the investment decision rule I(r), all as functions of the manager's report r.
When the project's true rate of return is r but the manager reports r, let a(r,r) denote the minimum amount of general-purpose effort that the manager must expend to generate cash flow consistent with his report r. That is:
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That is, U denotes the agent's interim utility net of his cost of operational effort a, but before the disutility of project development effort e. Contingent on the reported return of r and the true return of r, the manager's ex post utility becomes:
Let U(r) denote the manager's utility when he reports his private information truthfully; that is:
Similarly, define a(r) ϵ a (r,r) . Given the definition in Equation (4), a managerial incentive plan can be equivalently represented by the triplet {I(r), a(r), s(r)}.
The firm owner's problem becomes:
The above optimization problem is a standard adverse selection problem. Its objective function reflects the expected value of the owner's payoff that equals the end-of-period cash flow net of compensation payment to the manager. The incentive compatibility constraints in (i) ensure that the manager finds it in his self interest to report his private information truthfully. The participation constraints in (ii) guarantee that the manager will earn at least his reservation utility, which has been normalized to zero without loss of generality.
We note that, in the absence of a hidden action problem associated with operational effort a, the manager would have no incentive to misrepresent his private information, since he is indifferent toward all investment policies. Because of the underlying hidden effort problem, however, the manager has a natural incentive to understate the project's rate of return. By understating the project's profitability, the manager can deliver the same level of performance with less exertion of personally costly effort.
To counteract the manager's incentives to understate the project's rate of return, the owner must provide the manager with informational rents. The basic trade-off for the owner is that the manager's informational rents will be increasing both in the induced effort level, a, as well as the set of states in which the project is undertaken. To focus on the main
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March 2009 American Accounting Association intuition of the model, we assume that the manager's operational effort is sufficiently valuable so that the owner always finds it optimal to induce the maximum level of effort, i.e., a(r) ϵ for all r. This requires that w ⅐ ϽϽ 1; that is, the marginal cost of operational a a effort at the maximum level of effort w ⅐ is sufficiently small relative to the marginal a, a, benefit of effort, which, in our model, has been normalized to 1. 8 Applying the standard arguments from the adverse selection literature based on ''local'' incentive compatibility constraints, it can be shown that the manager's informational rent takes the form:
This local first-order condition combined with the monotonicity requirement that I(r) is non-decreasing (i.e., the investment policy is upper-tailed) ensures that the mechanism is globally incentive compatible. Equation (5) shows that if the owner approves the project, then the manager will earn more than his reservation utility of zero (i.e., the manager will earn informational rent). Furthermore, it shows that the compensation scheme must be structured so that the manager's informational rent increases at the rate of k ⅐ w ⅐ in the a project's rate of return (in the range of states in which the project is undertaken; that is, when I(r) ϭ 1). In the absence of such increasing informational rents schedule, the manager would have an incentive to understate r so that he can shirk on the personally costly operational effort a.
Using integration by parts, the expected informational rent becomes:
Ϫϱ
The owner's maximization problem thus simplifies to:
Since the above optimization problem must be solved subject to the monotonicity constraint that I(r) is non-decreasing, the owner's choice of investment decision rule I(⅐) simply amounts to choosing a hurdle rate h 0 such that the project is approved if and only if r Ͼ h 0 .
Lemma 1: It is optimal to approve the project if and only if its rate of return exceeds a hurdle rate h 0 which satisfies h 0 Ͼ 0 and solves the equation:
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix. 8 In the absence of this assumption, the optimal choice of managerial operational effort a will generally depend on the reported value of r because the owner will use both a(r) and I(r) to limit the manager's informational rents. While the analysis becomes considerably more complex, the qualitative nature of our main results remains virtually unchanged. 9 See the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix for details.
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The result below characterizes how the optimal hurdle rate varies with the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set.
Proposition 1:
The optimal hurdle rate, h 0 , is increasing in the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set, .
To understand the intuition behind this result, note that, for a given hurdle rate, an increase in increases the number of states in which the project is approved and hence increases the manager's informational rents. The owner thus optimally adjusts the hurdle rate upward to curtail informational rents.
Under the hurdle rate mechanism identified above, Equation (5) implies that the manager's compensation can be written as:
The first term on the right-hand side is the manager's compensation for his disutility of operational efforts. The second term represents the manager's informational rent, which increases linearly in r when r Ͼ h 0 . The contract in Equation (8) can therefore be interpreted as consisting of a fixed salary component of w and k ⅐ w ⅐ ''options'' each with a strike (a) a price of h 0 . This option contract interpretation will be helpful in understanding the intuition behind some of our results in the next subsection.
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Main Setting
We now consider our main setting in which the project development effort e is endogenously chosen by the manager. Ideally, to motivate project development effort, managerial compensation should be linked to the project's realized rate of return r. In our model, however, r is unobservable and nonverifiable by the firm, and therefore managerial compensation cannot directly depend on r.
In making the investment decision, the owner must rely on the privately informed manager's report about the project's rate of return. As the preceding analysis shows, however, this enables the manager to earn informational rents. To ensure that the manager reports his private information truthfully, the manager's informational rents must increase in the project's rate of return r at the rate of k ⅐ w ⅐ (in the range of states in which the a project is undertaken). This implies that the higher is the project's rate of return r, the higher will be the amount of rents extracted by the manager. As a consequence, the manager has a natural incentive to exert personally costly effort e because it enhances
The Accounting Review March 2009 American Accounting Association the expected value of r. Therefore, managerial informational rent provides the firm with an indirect benefit through its incentive effect on the manager's choice of project development effort e.
We again focus on the scenario in which the manager's operational effort is sufficiently valuable so that the owner seeks to induce the maximum level of operational effort In a. choosing an optimal incentive scheme, the owner now also has to take into account the manager's incentive constraint for the project development effort e:
Ϫϱ {I(⅐),e(⅐),s(⅐)} subject to:
In addition to the manager's truth-telling constraints in (i) and the interim participation constraints in (ii), an optimal incentive scheme must also satisfy the manager's ex ante participation constraint in (iii), and the incentive constraint for the project development effort in (iv). We note that the truth-telling constraints in (i) ensure that, regardless of his previous choice of project development effort e, the manager finds it in his self-interest to report the project's rate of return truthfully for each realized value of r.
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Constraints (i) and (ii) in program P 2 require that the manager's informational rents must satisfy Equation (5). Furthermore, we note that the ex ante participation constraint in (iii) is automatically satisfied given the interim participation constraints in (ii).
12 Therefore, after substituting for the manager's expected utility from Equation (6), the owner's optimization problem simplifies to:
Ϫϱ {I(r),e} subject to:
Ϫρ e As before, the manager's truth-telling constraints require that the above optimization program must be solved subject to the monotonicity constraint that I(r) is non-decreasing; i.e., the investment policy must be upper-tailed. Given this constraint, the owner's choice
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h {h,e} subject to:
As discussed in connection with Lemma 1, the owner's choice of hurdle rate has two distinct impacts on her expected payoff. As the hurdle rate increases above the cost of capital, the owner's expected profit decreases because some positive NPV projects are rejected. At the same time, since the manager earns informational rents only if the project is approved, the manager's informational rents decrease as the hurdle rate increases. In the benchmark setting, the manager's project development effort is exogenous and hence the optimal hurdle rate balances these two conflicting effects. When the project development effort must be induced endogenously, however, an increase in the hurdle rate has an additional effect on the owner's expected payoff. The manager's incentives to exert personally costly project development effort decreases as the hurdle rate increases because a higher hurdle rate reduces the probability that the project will be subsequently approved.
To solve P 3 , we first examine how the manager's choice of return enhancing effort e changes with the hurdle rate. Given a hurdle rate h, the manager will choose his project development effort e to maximize the objective function in Equation (9). The first term of the manager's objective function represents the expected value of managerial informational rents, whereas the second term is the manager's disutility of project development effort. To ensure that the manager's objective function is concave in e, we impose the following assumption:
Given A1, the manager's incentive compatibility constraint with regard to his choice of e can be replaced with its first-order condition:
In choosing the level of project development effort e, the manager equates the marginal return from increasing e, k ⅐ w ⅐ ⅐ [1 Ϫ F(h Ϫ e Ϫ )], to its marginal cost, v ⅐ e. To a 13 This assumption ensures that the marginal cost of project development effort increases at a sufficiently high rate so that the manager's objective function is globally concave. It can be verified that a weaker condition, namely max ƒ(⅐) Ͻ suffices to ensure the concavity of the manager's objective function in Equation (9). The v , k ⅐ w ⅐ a stronger condition in Assumption A1 is imposed to ensure that the owner's objective function is also well behaved; i.e., it is single-peaked in h when evaluated at the induced choice of project development effort e(h). See the proof of Proposition 3 for details.
March 2009 American Accounting Association interpret the marginal return from increasing the project development effort e, it is instructive to refer back to the ''option'' contract representation in Equation (8). Under this interpretation, the manager receives k ⅐ w ⅐ options each with a strike price of h and hence a his utility takes the form:
The manager's marginal return from increasing the project development effort is therefore equal to the probability that his options end-in-the-money (i.e., [1 Ϫ F(h Ϫ e Ϫ )]) times the number of options (i.e., k ⅐ w ⅐ a).
Let e(h) denote the manager's optimal choice of project development effort as a function of h. We have the following results:
Proposition 2: The manager's choice of project development effort e decreases in the hurdle rate h.
To understand the intuition behind this result, it is again useful to refer to the option contract representation of managerial compensation. A decrease in the hurdle rate amounts to decreasing the strike price of the manager's options. We note that decreasing the strike price of the manager's options increases the probability that the manager's options end-inthe-money (i.e., decreasing h increases [1 Ϫ F(h Ϫ e Ϫ )]), and thus increases the manager's marginal return from e. Since the marginal cost of project development effort is independent of the hurdle rate, the manager responds by increasing the level of project development effort.
Having characterized the manager's optimal response e(h), we now turn to the owner's choice of hurdle rate. For a given hurdle rate h, let ⌸(h, e(h)) denote the owner's expected payoff evaluated at the manager's optimal response e(h); that is:
h Differentiating with respect to h yields:
The above equation illustrates that an increase in the hurdle rate has two different effects on the owner's expected profit. The first-term on the right-hand side of Equation (11), reflects the hurdle rate's ''direct'' effect and captures the familiar tension between Ѩ⌸ , Ѩh curtailing managerial informational rents and enhancing investment efficiency for a given e. If the project development effort e were exogenous, as assumed in the benchmark setting examined earlier, then the optimal hurdle rate would be given by the solution of the equation ϭ 0.
Ѩ⌸ Ѩh
In addition to this direct effect, an increase in the hurdle rate impacts the owner's expected payoff indirectly through the manager's incentives to contribute project development effort. This ''indirect'' effect is represented by the second term on the right-hand side
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Ѩ⌸ Ѩe
of increasing the hurdle rate on the owner's expected profit ⌸ is always negative. The firstorder condition for the optimal hurdle rate h* is given by:
Ѩe Assumption A1 guarantees that ⌸(⅐) is a single-peaked function of h, and therefore the above first-order condition is also sufficient. Let e* ϵ e(h*) denote the project development effort induced by h*.
Proposition 3:
There exists a unique solution {h*, e*} to the optimization program P 3 .
Furthermore, h* Ͻ h 0 (e*), i.e., the optimal hurdle rate is strictly lower than what it would be if the manager's project development effort were directly observable.
The optimal choice of hurdle rate balances the owner's objectives of (i) maximizing expected investment payoffs net of managerial informational rents, and (ii) providing project development incentives to the manager. If there were no moral hazard problem regarding the manager's choice of e, then the owner would have to concern herself only with objective (i) above. Since the project development effort has to be endogenously induced, however, the owner has to take into account that the manager's project development incentives are decreasing in the hurdle rate. Consequently, the optimal hurdle rate in the presence of managerial effort incentive problem is lower than what it would be in the absence of such an incentive problem; that is, h* Ͻ h 0 (e*). The result below discusses how the optimal project development effort e* changes with parameters of the model.
Proposition 4:
The optimal project development effort e* is decreasing in for all . v k Furthermore, 0 Ͻ e* Ͻ with e* ϭ 0, and
To gain intuition for why e* decreases in it is helpful to note that represents the v v , k k firm's cost-benefit ratio of project development effort. To see this, note that the project's net present value is equal to k ⅐ r, the scale of investment times the project's rate of return. The scale of investment thus amplifies the effect of project development effort e on the firm's investment payoffs. Since v indexes the manager's cost of project development effort, can be considered as a measure of the firm's cost-benefit ratio of the project development v k effort. As this cost-benefit ratio becomes more favorable, the owner finds it optimal to induce a higher level of project development effort.
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March 2009 American Accounting Association To generate this figure, we assume that w ⅐ ϭ 0.01 and ε ϳ N(0,100). a Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the optimal level of project development effort e* and for two different values of cost-benefit ratio. It shows that e* approaches zero as becomes small and approaches as grows large. Furthermore, for each , the k ⅐ w ⅐ a v optimal project development effort e* is higher for ϭ than for ϭ v 1 v 1 . k 500 k 300 We recall that the optimal hurdle rate in the benchmark setting, h 0 (e), is above the firm's cost of capital for each value of e, and is monotonically increasing in , the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set. Since h* Ͻ h 0 (e*), a natural question is whether the optimal hurdle rate h* can ever be below the firm's cost of capital. It is also interesting to examine how the optimal hurdle rate varies with the quality of the firm's investment opportunities.
Proposition 5: If is sufficiently small, then: v k (i) As a function of , the optimal hurdle rate h* achieves its lowest value when is neither too low nor too high. (ii) The optimal hurdle rate h* is less than the firm's cost of capital for all ʦ ( 1 , 2 ), where Ϫϱ Ͻ 1 Ͻ 2 Ͻ ϱ.
The Accounting Review March 2009 American Accounting Association Unlike the benchmark setting in which the optimal hurdle rate is increasing in the prior quality of the firm's investment opportunity set, Proposition 5 shows that the optimal hurdle rate is generally non-monotonic in . In particular, this result shows that optimal hurdle rates will be lower in firms with ''medium'' quality investment opportunities than in firms with investment opportunities of relatively extreme (low or high) quality. Furthermore, Proposition 5 shows that the optimal hurdle rate is below the firm's cost of capital provided that the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set is neither too low nor too high.
This relationship between h* and is depicted by the solid curve in Figure 3 . For each , we also calculate h 0 (e*), the optimal hurdle rate if the managerial effort could be directly dictated to be e*, and plot it as the dashed line in Figure 3 . While the optimal hurdle rate in the benchmark setting, h 0 (e*), is monotonically increasing in the prior quality of investment opportunities , the optimal hurdle rate in the presence of project development effort incentive problem is non-monotonic in . The optimal hurdle rate h* approaches h 0 (e*) as becomes more extreme (small or large). In contrast, the difference between the optimal hurdle rate h* and h 0 (e*) is relatively large for intermediate values of . Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that h* is below the firm's cost of capital for each in [ 1 , 2 ].
To understand the intuition behind this result, note that the owner finds it optimal to reduce the hurdle rate below h 0 (e*) because a lower hurdle rate increases the manager's
The Accounting Review March 2009 American Accounting Association incentives to provide project development effort. However, the manager's choice of project development effort becomes relatively insensitive to the owner's choice of hurdle rate as the ex ante quality of investment opportunity becomes relatively extreme; that is, be-
Ѩe Ѩh
comes small as approaches Ϫϱ or ϱ. This is why the gap between h* and h 0 (e*) shrinks as approaches ϱ. As approaches Ϫϱ, the gap between h* and h 0 (e*) shrinks even faster because the project development effort is not only more difficult to motivate through a lowering of the hurdle rate, but it is also relatively less valuable to the owner because the project is almost surely to be rejected. 14 In contrast, the optimal hurdle rate h* is lower for intermediate values of for two different reasons. First, the manager's project development effort e is relatively more important to the owner for these ''medium'' quality investment opportunities; that is, is
Ѩ⌸ Ѩe
relatively high for intermediate values of . Put differently, a ''booster shot'' in the form of upfront project development effort is relatively more valuable for these intermediate quality investment opportunities. Second, the manager's informational rent, and hence his choice of project development effort, is also more sensitive to a change in the hurdle rate h for these medium quality projects (i.e., the absolute value of is relatively high for
Ѩe Ѩh intermediate values of ).
To the extent that one can find a suitable proxy, Proposition 5 generates testable implications on the relationship between a firm's choice of hurdle rate and the ex ante quality of its investment opportunity set. In particular, Proposition 5 implies that hurdle rates will be higher in firms whose investment opportunities are relatively good or relatively poor than in firms with investment opportunities of intermediate quality. If investment opportunities remain relatively stable over time, then one possible proxy for the quality of a business unit's investment opportunities might be its historical performance. Our result in Proposition 5 then suggests that, controlling for other factors, we would find that investment hurdle rates are higher for divisions with ''extreme'' performance than for divisions with ''average'' performance.
To conclude this section, we examine a delegated investment setting in which the manager is not required to report his private information to the owner. Instead, the owner hands over the investment decision to the manager. To ensure that the manager makes the desirable investment decision and exerts the optimal amount of operational and project development efforts, the owner compensates the manager on the basis of a suitable performance measure. We consider linear compensation contracts of the form:
where ␣ denote the manager's fixed salary, ␤ is the manager's bonus parameter, and is the managerial performance measure. A performance measure is said to be optimal if there exist coefficients (␣,␤) such that the linear compensation contract in Equation (13) satisfies the manager's participation constraints, and generates the same expected payoff for the owner as the optimal incentive plan under the centralized setting.
14 Recall that the hurdle rate's ''indirect'' effect on the owner's expected profit depends on the product of and
Ѩe Ѩh
As approaches Ϫϱ, both and become small.
Ѩ⌸ Ѩe Ѩ⌸
.
Ѩe Ѩh Ѩe
The Accounting Review March 2009 American Accounting Association Residual income has recently received considerable attention in the literature. Unlike operating income, which does not charge for the use of capital, residual income has the advantage that the owner can tailor the capital charge rate so that the manager internalizes her investment objectives. In our one-period model, operating income equals net cash flow a ϩ k ⅐ r ⅐ I. Consequently, residual income corresponding to the capital charge rate of r becomes:
Proposition 6: Residual income based on the capital charge rate of h* constitutes an optimal performance measure.
Equation (14) shows that the manager will adopt the optimal project acceptance decision provided the capital charge rate is set equal to the optimal hurdle rate h*. Furthermore, the manager will exert the maximum level of operational effort if the manager's bonus a parameter ␤ equals his marginal cost of effort w ⅐ An appropriate choice of the fixed a. salary ␣ then ensures that when the investment project is undertaken, the linear contract of the form in Equation (13) will provide the manager with a total compensation of w ϩ k (a) ⅐ w ⅐ ⅐ max{0,(r Ϫ h*)}, which is equal to his compensation from the optimal incentive a scheme under the centralized setting. Consequently, the manager has incentives to exert the optimal amount of project development effort e*.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have examined the optimal choice of hurdle rates in an agency-theoretic capital budgeting setting. Unlike the prior literature that treats the firm's investment opportunity set as exogenous, we focus on a scenario in which the firm's manager can exert personally costly effort to improve the expected quality of the investment project available to the firm. We show that the optimal hurdle rate is always lower than what it would be if the manager's project development effort were not subject to moral hazard. While the ''standard'' agencytheoretic model of capital budgeting predicts that the optimal hurdle rate is always above the firm's cost of capital, our analysis identifies plausible circumstances under which it can be optimal to set the hurdle rate below the firm's cost of capital. We also investigate how the optimal hurdle rate varies with the quality of the firm's investment opportunity set. Our results shed light on the empirical findings of Poterba and Summers (1995) who document that hurdle rates exhibit considerable variation across firms.
Our analysis suggests several new avenues for future research. One possibility is to extend our analysis to a multidivisional setting in which divisions compete for scarce investment capital.
15 It would be interesting to investigate how interdivisional competition for capital would affect divisional managers' incentives to undertake project development activities. One might expect that competition for capital would motivate managers to enhance average qualities of their divisions' investment opportunities. However, such competition would also reduce the amount of expected informational rent extracted by any given manager, which would have a dampening effect on managers' project development incentives.
Our analysis has focused on a scenario in which the manager's effort influences the project's expected rate of return, but has no impact on the quality of information that
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March 2009 American Accounting Association the manager subsequently receives about the project. In future research, it might be interesting to examine settings in which the manager can exert effort to increase the informativeness of his signal about the project's profitability. In a first-best setting, the owner would clearly prefer a more informative signal as it would lead to a more efficient investment decision. With asymmetric information, however, a more informative signal also implies a greater severity of the adverse selection problem and hence higher informational rents for the manager. It would be interesting to examine how the optimal hurdle rate in such a setting would differ from the predictions of standard adverse selection models.
APPENDIX PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The manager's utility payoff contingent on the true probability parameter r and the reported r can be written as:
where a(r,r) ϭ c(r) Ϫ k ⅐ (1 ϩ r) ⅐ I(r) denotes the effort level that the manager has to exert in order to generate cash flows consistent with his report r. It can be shown with standard techniques that any incentive compatible mechanism has to satisfy the following ''local'' condition:
Ѩr
Differentiating Equation (15) with respect to r gives:
Since the participation constraint U(r) Ն 0 will hold with equality for the lowest type (i.e., U(Ϫϱ) ϭ 0), the above equation implies that the manager will earn the following informational rents:
Ϫϱ
Using the expression in (16) to solve for the compensation payments and integrating by parts yield:
Consequently, the owner's objective in P 0 simplifies to the following optimization problem:
The above objective function can be maximized pointwise. Clearly, I(r) ϭ 0 if r Յ 0. If I(r) ϭ 1, the owner will choose a(r) to maximize:
Since H(⅐) is decreasing, it will be optimal to choose a(r) ϭ whenever I(r) ϭ 1 provided a that w ⅐ is sufficiently small relative to one. A sufficient condition for this is given by: a
We assume that the above condition holds. As a consequence, the owner will choose the investment policy I(r) to maximize:
By pointwise maximization, it follows that the owner will choose I(r) ϭ 1 if and only if r Ն h 0 , where the hurdle rate h 0 is given by:
To complete the proof, it needs to be shown that the above incentive scheme is globally incentive compatible. As shown by Mirrlees (1971) , a mechanism is incentive compatible provided it is locally incentive compatible, and U(r,r) is (weakly) increasing in r. For Ѩ Ѩr the above mechanism:
Ѩr which is increasing in r since wЈ(⅐) is increasing, a(r,r) is (weakly) increasing in r and the optimal I(⅐) is an upper-tail investment policy. Ⅲ
Proof of Proposition 1
By the implicit function theorem:
Since HЈ(⅐) Ͻ 0 by assumption, we have
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Proof of Proposition 2
Let ϭ E[U(r)͉e] Ϫ e 2 denote the manager's ex ante expected utility, i.e., expected v V 2 informational rents net of the cost of project development effort. The manager chooses his project development effort to maximize Given that:
the first-order condition for the manager's maximization problem in choosing e becomes:
(
17) de
Notice that by Assumption A1:
Hence, is globally concave in e and the second order condition is satisfied.
V By the implicit function theorem, the reaction of the endogenously determined e to h is:
Proof of Proposition 3
As before, we assume that w ⅐ is sufficiently small so that the owner seeks to induce a the maximum amount of operational effort
The truth-telling constraints in (i) and the a. interim participation constraints in (ii) then require that the manager's informational rents take the form:
Ϫϱ
The above equation shows that the manager earns non-negative informational rent for each r and each e. This implies that the manager's ex ante expected utility E[U(r)͉e] Ϫ v(e) is positive when e ϭ 0; i.e., the manager can earn more than his reservation utility by exerting zero project development effort. Therefore, the manager's ex ante expected utility will always be positive when he chooses his project development effort optimally. Consequently, we can drop the ex ante participation constraint in (iii) as it is implied by the interim participation constraints in (ii).
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March 2009 American Accounting Association Therefore, the owner's problem simplifies to the optimization program in P 3 . The remainder of the proof shows that there exists a unique solution (h*,e*) to P 3 . As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, for any given h, the manager's optimal choice of project development effort, e(h) , is uniquely given by the first-order condition in Equation 10. Let ⌸(h,e(h)) denote the owner's expected payoff as a function of the hurdle rate h. Differentiating with respect to h yields:
Ѩh dh Ѩe where:
Ѩe
Hence: 
where e* ϵ e(h*) denotes the induced choice of project development effort at h ϭ h*, as defined by Equation (17).
Since h* Ͻ w ⅐ ⅐ H(h* Ϫ e* Ϫ ) and H(⅐) is a decreasing function, we have h* a Ͻ h 0 (e*) ϵ w ⅐ ⅐ H(h 0 Ϫ e* Ϫ ). a To show that the hurdle rate identified in Equation (19) is indeed a global maximum, we will show that the owner's expected payoff function ⌸(h,e(h)) is single-peaked in h. Differentiating B with respect to h yields:
where the argument of H(⅐), F(⅐), and ƒ(⅐) is (h Ϫ e(h) Ϫ ) and has been suppressed for brevity. Given Assumption A1, it follows that k ⅐ w ⅐ ⅐ ƒ(⅐) Ͻ 2 ⅐ k ⅐ w ⅐ ⅐ ƒ(⅐) Ͻ v. As a a a consequence, Ͼ 0. Furthermore, since Ͻ 0 and
follows that Ͼ 0. Given that B ϭ 0 at h* and A Ͻ 0 for any h, ⌸ is increasing in h for dB dh h Ͻ h* and decreasing in h for h Ͼ h*. Therefore, ⌸(⅐) is single-peaked and the solution identified in Equation (19) combined with e* ϵ e(h*) constitutes the unique solution to the maximization problem in P 3 . Ⅲ
Proof of Proposition 4
By (17) and (19), the optimal values of h* and e* are given by the unique solution to the following system of nonlinear equations: 
